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There has been a long andcontinuingdebate on the determinants ofstockprices. One view
is that these prices reflect economic fundamentals; thatis, a firm's stock price equals the
present discounted value of its dividends. Another view is thatstockprices arc "bubbles"
and deviate from their fundamentals. As an empiricalmatter, there is currently no consensus
on which of these views is correct.
Historically, the possibility that stock prices are "bubbles"was raised by a number of
extreme incidents. Perhaps the most well-known of these is the SouthSea Bubble. During
the first six months of 1720 the stock price of the BritishSouth Sea Company rose by 642
percent; during the last six months of 1720 the price fell back to itsoriginal value. A similar
rise and sudden decline occurred in the stock price of JohnLaw's Mississippi Land Company
in France. Both episodes were reminiscent of the DutchTulip Mania in the previous century,
andwereprecursors of the stock market crashes of subsequent centuries of which October
1929 and October 1987 are perhaps the most famous.While it is by no means clear that
these events constitute evidence of "bubbles" (seee.g. Garber (1989)), they were important
in that many of them lead to regulation. Forexample, the South Sea Bubble caused the
British Parliament to pass the South Sea Act whicheffectively eliminated the stock market
as a source of funds for over a century. In the United States, the GreatCrash of 1929 lead
to the creation of the SEC and the introduction ofnumerous regulations, many of which are
still in force.
More recently, the results of Leroy and Porter(1981), Shiller (1981), and Grossman and
Shiller (1981), among others,suggest that stock prices deviate from market fundamentals.
There is again no wide agreement on thevalidity of these studies; those who have challenged
the methodology adopted include Flavin(1983), Nlcidon (1986a,b) and Marsh and Merton
(1986). West (1988) provides a more completesurvey of this and related controversies. Pricepaths that deviatefrom fundamentals have alsobeenobservedinexperimentalsettings (see
Smith,Suchanekand Williams (1988)).
Inaddition to the empirical debate about the determinants of stockprices, a growing
theoretical literature has begun to address the question of howasset prices can deviate
from market fundamentals. Camerer (1989) givesa full survey of this literature. in infinite
horizon models, rational bubbles have appearedas explanations for the existence of fiat
money starting with Samuelson (1958). Important contributions were subsequently madeby
Wallace (1980), Flood and Garber (1980), Blanchard(1979), Blanchard and Watson (1982)
and Tirole (1985), among others. Although these theoriescan explain a number of features
of "bubbles" they are not entirely satisfactoryexplanations of the phenomena the empirical
literature on stock prices has been concerned with. Some ofthese models require that prices
grow slower than the expected growth rate of the aggregate wealth of theeconomy. There is
no explanation of how bubbles get started or of why they crash sincestarting and stopping
are taken as exogenous in these types of models. Diba and Grossman(1988) have argued
there is no possibility that price bubblescan crash and restart. Also these theories cannot
address the question of whether finitely-livedsecurity prices can deviate from fundamentals.
The major result for finite horizon models isa negative one. Tirole (1982) argues that in
a discrete time finite horizon setting stock prices cannot deviate fromfundamentals unless
traders are irrational or myopic. lie makes threeimportant assumptions in ruling out finite
bubbles. First, he points out that witha finite horizon and a finite price path the bubble
would never get started because it would "unravel."To see this let the final date in the
economy be T. Then at date T —Ian agent would not buy the asset at a price above the
discounted value of its payoFf at T because he would incura loss if he did so. Therefore, the
bubble cannot exist at T— I. Similarly, by backwardinduction it follows that a bubble cannot
exist at any point in time. Secondly, witha finite horizon traders cannot be induced to hold
the stock by a price path thatgoes to infinity because there is finite wealth. Consequently,
2there mustbe a date at which the (real) price path necessary to support the bubbleexceeds
the total available wealthinthe economy. At that date the bubble will crash, but then
at the date before that no other trader will buy the asset. Again by backwardinduction
the bubble cannot get started. Finally, without insurance motives fortrading not all of the
finite number of traders can rationally expect to benefit since they knowthat the bubble is
a zero-sum game. If traders are risk averse, some must be strictly worse off sincethey bear
risk and not everybody can have a positive expected return.
Tirole's (1982) results exemplify the difficulties of constructing theories whichare based
on conventional assumptions and which are consistent with bubbles. These difficultieshave
lead some authors to abandon the traditional neoclassicalassumption of rational behavior.
One example is Shiller (1984) who models stock pricesas being subject to "fads." Another is
DeLong, Shleifer, Summers, and Waldmann (1990) who assume thatsome traders continue
to hold beliefs even after it becomes clear these are rejected by the data. Theseirrational
traders are consistently overly optimistic (or overlypessimistic) and take larger positions
than they would do if they were rational. Thismeans they bear more risk than is optimal
but their wealth is not driven to zero. They thereforepersistently cause stock prices to
deviate from their fundamental. (See Camerer (1989) for otherexamples.)
The model presented below takes a different approach. Weassume all agents are rational
but they populate an imperfect world which is characterizedby asymmetric information.
In particular, there is an agency problem between investors andportfolio managers which
is similar to that originally identified by Jensen andMeckling (1976) between bondholders
and equityholders. In the corporate finance literature theanalysis of agency relationships is
now commonplace and their implications for firms' investment decisionsare well known. It is
widely accepted that asymmetric information can lead to firms making inefficient investment
decisions. Despite the fact that in the United States andmany other countries, a majority of
the wealth held in stocks is invested indirectlythrough financial intermediaries, the implica-
3Lions of agency relationships between investors and portfoliomanagers for asset.pricinghave
not been fully investigated. It is argued below that one of the manifestations of asymmetric
information in this context is that asset prices can deviate from their fundamental values
and be subject to bubbles.
We assume there are two types of people that can obtain the qualificationsnecessary to
become a portfolio manager. The first group, who are good portfoliomanagers, can each
identify a number of undervalued firms and this allows them to make a higher return on
the funds they invest than traders with no special information. We use a version of the
Glosten and Milgrom (1985) model to show how they accomplish this. Thus marketsare not
strong-form efficient but this is not inconsistent with rationality. The secondgroup consists
of bad portfolio managers who are unable to identify undervalued firms. Lenderscannot.
observe which type of portfolio manager they are entrusting their wealth to.
In Section 2 we focus on the actions of the bad portfoliomanagers. We assume that
these portfolio managers, who have no wealth of theirown, receive a proportion of the
profits that they make so their payoff has the form of a call option; this is later shown to be
an optimal contract. This type of compensation scheme, where the payment. to the portfolio
manager is a call option on the portfolio's incremental return, is widely used in practice in
the investments industry (see, e.g., Kritzman (1987)). Inour model its important feature is
that it can induce risk-loving behavior.
We show that the trading activity of these portfoliomanagers causes a bubble in the
sense used by Harrison and Kreps (1978), and Tirole (1982). A bubble is defined to be a
price path supported by the trading of agents who arc "willing topay more for [the sccurityj
than they would pay if obliged to hold it [to the horizon)." We show that the badportfolio
managers strictly prefer to speculate in this sense. This strict preference can occur because
of the fact that there is an asymmetry in their incentives. If they lose themoney entrusted
to them they obtain nothing no matter how badly they do. If they do well theykeep a
4proportion of what they make. They are therefore prepared to purchase securities whichare
trading above their fundamental provided there is some chance of a capital gaineven though
they know that there is a good chance they will lose their investors'money when the bubble
crashes.
In Section 3 we consider the entire stock market, of which the badportfolio managers
are a part. In Section 3.1 we develop a model of how the good portfoliomanagers profitably
trade on their information. In Section 3.2 we consider bothgroups of portfolio managers and
demonstrate that the contract assumed in Section 2 is an optimal contract. Itis not worth-
while for lenders to entrust their wealth to portfoliomanagers they are sure will speculate.
however, they cannot tell them apart from the good portfoliomanagers that can identify
undervalued firms. Therefore, in equilibrium, the goodmanagers subsidize the ones that
speculate and lenders earn their opportunity cost.
The example presented in Sections 2 and 3 shows that bubblescan occur in finite horizon
models when traders are rational. Since our results differ from those of Tirolean important
issue concerns the robustness of our example and its implications for theories ofasset pricing.
Section 4 discusses the critical elements of the example that lead to bubbles.
2Speculative bubbles
Thissection considers a stylized model of a stock market in which thereare three traders.
We assume that these traders have no wealth of theirown but instead manage other people's
wealth for them. They receive a proportion ofany profits they make. Below it is shown
that this contract can be optimal. Subsection 2.1 outlines the basic model. Thekey issue
is whether or not these traders perceive there to besome chance of a capital gain at all
points in time. This depends on what they conjecture about the strategies of other traders.
We consider a very stylized structure which makes traders'conjectures about other traders'
actions very simple. In particular, we assume in subsection 2.2 that traders leave the market
5when they "die" and that their "death" times are correlated in a particular way. This
rationale for exiting from the market, and the correlation structure of these "death times,"
are clearly not meant to be taken literally but rather are devices for streamlining the model
in order to focus on the theoretical issue of the existence of bubbles in a finite world. The
main point is to develop a simple structure under which the logical sequence of conjectures
traders go through will not lead to unraveling but to rational traders deciding to speculate.
Having developed this structure we go on to briefly show, in subsection 2.3, how the model
can be extended to the case where a trader's exit from the market arises from an endogenous
decision rather than being due to an exogenous event.
2.1 The basic model
The following assumptions detail the basic model.
(Al) There are three traders called Persons 1, 2 and 3.
(A2) The model lasts for one continuous period, beginning at I =0and ending at I =1.
Trades can occur at any time between 0 and 1.
(A3) The traders consume just before they die which occurs somewhere between 0 and 1.
(A4) The agents' utility is an increasing function of consumption. They can be either risk
neutral or risk averse.
(As) Person 1 dies at date t1whichis drawn from a uniform distribution on [0, 1). Person
2 dies at 2where
12= LI +— ti). (1)
Person 3 dies at 13where
2
13= t+ (1 —t). (2)
6(A6) Agents learn their death times just in time to allow them to trade and consume before
theydie. Death is private information.
(A7)There exists a firm with a certainpayoff whichfor simplicity we normalize to zero. In
other words the fundamental is zero. This is known to all traders. The firm issues one
indivisible share. This share cannot be short sold.
(A8) Person 1 is always endowed with the share. Person I knows his identity.
(A9) Persons 2 and 3 arc not endowed with any shares. T'hey do not know their identities
(i.e., whether they are going to die last) and assign equal weight to each of the two
possibilities.
(AlO) Persons 2 and 3 have no wealth of their own. However, they are able to invest other
people's wealth. They arc to be thought of as portfolio managers. They have a fixed
amount B (=Iin illustrations) they invest. The amount they repay to investors if
the amount they have at the end is y, is:
=B+c(y—B)fory>B 3 =y fory<B
where 0 I. (In illustrations it is assumed that i= 0.95.)In effect, the payoff
the portfolio managers receive is a call option.
The accounting system is such that they cannot simply consume the money they bor-
row. They can only consume the fee that they are paid for managing the portfolio. It
follows from (3) that this is a proportion 1 —cof the profits that they make if these
are positive and nothing if they arc negative.
(All) The identity of the owner of the share is private information throughout.
(A12) Trade occurs in the following way. All traders have the same expectations about
prices p(t)e at which trades will occur at time t. When a person decides to sell theshare he seeks out a buyer. lie locates one or the other of the traders that remain
in the market with equal probability. If he finds another trader then trade occurs at
p(t)C•Ifthe seller cannot find a buyer this becomes public information and the price
of the share falls to zero. In illustrations it is assumed that
p(j)C=gforE[O,1). (4)
(A13) When a trade occurs only parties to the trade observe the transaction.
(A14) All agents know the structure of the model and the distributions of the random
variables, but do not observe the particular realisations of random variables.
2.2 Example of a bubble
The share considered has a fundamental of zero. It is clear that an equilibrium with p(t)c =0
exists where the share price reflects this fundamental. The question that we address is the
following. Do there exist other price paths such that a rational agent is prepared to buy the
share at a strictly positive price even though he knows the final payoff to the share is zero?
The agency problem between investors and their portfoliomanagers is not sufficient by itself
to provide a satisfactory theory of bubbles in asset prices. When the portfoliomanagers
have a call option on the incremental value of the portfolio, theymay be indifferent between
buying and not buying a stock that is trading above its fundamental. If they are prepared
to buy then bubbles may exist. However, a theory which critically depends on people's
behavior when they are indifferent is not very satisfactory. We therefore develop a theory
where portfolio managers in the group that cannot identify undervalued securitiesare strictly
better off investing in stocks trading above their fundamental.
Our first result is:
Proposition 1 When death times are unknown there exists a set of self-fulfilling beliefs
such that two trades will always occur at a strictly positive price between date 0 and date I
8provided:
(i) O<p(i)c <BforalltE[O,l);
(ii) pl(t)c> 0for all LE [0,1)
To see why this holds consider a numerical example where t1 =0.1so that t2 =0.4and
=0.7(from (1) and (2)). As mentioned in the previous subsection we also assume
=t,B =Iand a =0.95.For ease of exposition we start by describing a sequence of
events, shown in Figure 1, without analyzing the traders' decisions. We then consider a set
of beliefs and show that these support the decisions in Figure 1. Finally, we show that the
beliefs are self-fulfilling.
At I =0Person 1 is endowed with the share. At I =0.1he finds out he's going to die and
searches for a buyer which is Person 2 or 3 with probability 0.5. For concreteness we assume
he finds Person 2 who buys the share at a price of 0.1. At I =0.4,just before he dies, Person
2 searches for a buyer and finds Person 3 who buys the share at a price of 0.4. He makes a
profit of 0.4 —0.1=0.3and after repaying his investors consumes (0.05)(0.3) =0.015.At
=0.6Person 3 searches for a buyer, but finds none. The bubble bursts and the price of the
stock falls from 0.6 to zero. Finally, at I =0.7Person 3 dies. At the time of his death, he
has 0.6 remaining and so is only able to return this amount to his investors. He consumes
nothing.
Consider the following set of beliefs. Given that pf(L)C >0,all agents believe that:
(a) if there is a prospective buyer alive he will be prepared to buy the share when ap-
proached.
Agents who do not know their own identity believe that:
(b) any agent offering to sell at a date in the interval 0 < t <1/3is Person 1 selling at i
with probability 1; and
9(c) any agent offering to sell at a date in the interval 1/3I < 1is Person I selling at t
with probability 0.1orPerson 2 or 3 selling at t with probability 0.6.
We demonstrate below that these beliefs support the sequence of actions in Figure 1 as an
equilibrium and that they are self- fulfilling. Figure 2 outlines the sequence of the buyers'
conjectures about the seller's identity discussed below.
First consider Person l's decision, lie knows from the structure of the model that for
0 <I < 11 Persons2 and 3 will be alive. Thus from (a), Person 1 believes he can sell the
share at any time until his death. Since the share price is increasing through time, it is
optimal for Person I to hold the share until he has to sell it at his death time 1. Thus at
=0.1,Person 1 will search for a buyer. There is a 0.5 probability he will find Person 2 and
a 0.5 probability he will find Person 3. For concreteness we suppose that Person 2 is found.
Next consider Person 2's decision. From (b), he believes that the seller is Person 1. He
can put himself in the place of Person 1 and by doing so deduce that Person l's optimal
strategy is to sell at his death time, He therefore knows that 1= 0.1which implies that
12= 0.4.This means that he should not wait past I =0.4to sell the share since if he survives
that date he will be the sole remaining trader; until that date there will definitely be another
buyer. Since the price is increasing, he should sell at I =0.4.
Person 2 finds the remaining trader, Person 3, at I= 0.4.Consider Person 3's decision.
Since he was not endowed with the share he knows he is Person 2 or 3, but does not know
which. Since he is approached at I =0.4he does not know whether the seller is Person 1, 2,
or 3. It follows from (c) that he believes there are two possibilities. There is a 0.4 probability
that the seller is Person I in which case I =0.4.This implies that 12= 0.6in which case
from (c) the share could be sold at any date up to this point. We refer to this first possibility
as state S to indicate the share can be sold again, lie also believes there is a 0.6 probability
that the seller is Person 2 or 3. In this case Person 1 must have sold it at t =0.1and there
will be no one for the trader to resell it to. We refer to this second possibility as state N to
10indicate that no resale is possible.
Thepayment schedule in (3) implies Person 3 cannot lose from buying the share and he
can gain if he manages to resell it at a higher price. Since he attaches a 0.4 probability to
there being another trader who he can resell the share to at a higher price, he is strictly
better off purchasing the share. What is the optimal time for him to try to sell the share? If
stateNis the true state, then there is no other trader to sell the share to. This possibility
therefore has noeffect onhis optimal selling time. If state S is the true state, then 11 =0.4
and t2 =0.6. Hence, sinceprice isrising his optimalaction is to search for a buyer at I =0.6.
In fact, inthisexamplethereis noother buyerto befound,so atI=0.6 herealisesthat he
is Person 3 andthebubblecrashes.At I =0.7Person 3 dies.
So far wehaveconsidered the case where I =0.1.It can be seen that for 0 < 11 5 1/3
the analysisis thesamebecause onlyPerson 1 can die in this interval. For 1/355 1 it
can beseenthat the beliefs (a) again make it optimal for Person 1 to sell at his death time.
The difference here is that the identity of the seller in the first transaction will be unknown.
The buyer's decision is then the same as Person 3's at I =0.4above; he cannot distinguish
between states S and N and assigns probabilities of 0.4 and 0.6 to these, respectively. Any
other transactions in the interval 1/3 5 I 5 1 also have this feature so that the analysis of
other possible cases is similar to that of the illustration.
Why arethebeliefs (a), that when found a prospective buyer will always purchase the
share, correct in equilibrium?First,considersomebodywho is approached after I =1/3.
Aprospective purchaser will be better off buyingprovided hebelieves that there is some
probability that he can resell the share. This depends on whether there is some probability
he can locate a prospective buyer and this conjectured buyer believes that he can resell the
share, and so on. From the point of view of any new buyer there is always a 0.4 probability
of another willing buyer later. This chance of state S is independent of time. At any point
a prospective buyer cannot distinguish between the seller being Person 1 or the seller being
11Person 2 or 3 and hence whether or not another buyer remains. As a buyer goes through
the logical sequence of conjectures concerning whether he will be able to resell, he knows for
certain that the share cannot be resold more than once. However, the person that he might
sell to will think there is a 0.1 probability he will be able to resell and so on; as far as each
buyer in the sequence is concerned there is always a possibility that the share can be resold
once. This is true for an infinite sequence of conjectured buyers. No matter how close to
=Ia sale were to occur, (1) and (2) together with p(L)e> 0imply that there is always a
0.4 possibility of reselling the share at a profit so unravelling does not occur. For anybody
approached before1/3 the analysis is similar except there is a probability of 1 they can
locate another willing buyer. Thus beliefs (a) are correct in equilibrium.
Why are beliefs (b) and (c) correct in equilibrium? It was argued above that Person 1
always sells at his death time t1andthe person he sells to always sells at t2. The unconditional
distribution of £1isuniform on 10,1) with density 1 and the unconditional distribution of t2
implied by (1) is uniform on 11/3,1) with density 3/2 as shown in Figure 3. Hence, the beliefs
(b) that for 0 <L < 1/3,anybody selling the stock is Person 1 with probability 1 are correct.
For 1/3 L￿I the probability the seller is Person 1 (i.e. state S) is 1/(1 + 3/2) =0.4and
the probability the seller is Persons 2 or 3 (i.e. state N) is (3/2)/(1 + 3/2) =0.6.Beliefs (c)
arc, therefore, also correct in equilibrium.
These arguments show that provided the expected price is always below B so that traders
have enough resources to buy the share and provided the price path is rising, there will always
be two trades at a strictly positive price. Thus Proposition 1 is demonstrated.
Why do our results differ from those of Tirole (1982)? II is first argument is that in a
discrete time finite horizon model a bubble would never get started because it would unravel.
If an asset's payoff at. date T is known to be zero then at date T —1nobody will buy it at
a positive price. Similarly at date 7' —2and so on so that the asset is always worthless. In
our model time is continuous so that although there is a final date L =1there is no date
12corresponding to T —1;no matter how close to I =Iit is always possible to resell the share
before the final date. Tue unravelling argument is not applicable.
Tirole's second argument is that with a finite horizon the price path cannot go to infinity
because there is finite wealth. If the price path did go to infinity the amount needed to
purchase the share would exceed the total wealth available in the economy. Again by back-
ward induction the bubble cannot get started. In our model the price path does not go to
infinity. The reason that this is not necessary to support the equilibrium is the correlation
structure of death times. No matter how close to t =1a trade occurs the probability of
finding a subsequent buyer is 0.4. It is always optimal for the trader to hold the stock until
the conjectured t2. Without some correlation structure of this type, the chance of finding a
buyer would fall towards zero and the price path would need to rise to infinity to induce the
trader not to sell.
His final argument for bubbles not existing is that, without insurance motives for trading,
not all of the finite number of traders can expect to be better off ex ante since they know that
the bubble is a zero-sum game. If they are risk averse some must be strictly worse off. In our
model all the traders participating in the bubble are strictly better off ex ante. The reason is
that they are investing with other people's money and their reward structure is such that they
do not care about the magnitude of any losses they incur. The people who bear the losses ex-
post arc the investors lending them the money. They are willing to lend because the traders
are pooled with portfolio managers that can identify profitable investment opportunities and
they effectively subsidize these losses by paying a higher interest rate than they would have
to in the absence of the bad portfolio managers. This aspect of the model is explained in
Section 3.
132.3 Extensions
The purpose of most of the assumptions used in the previous section is to simplify the
analysis. For example, having Person 1 endowed with the share limits the number of cases
that need to be considered. It would also be possible to have the share randomly endowed.
In that case neither Persons 1, 2, or 3 knows their identity and the number of possible states
of the world each agent must consider is significantly increased. However, the results do not
change substantively.
The assumption that outlines the way in which trade occurs is an important one. Its
role is essentially similar to that of the Walrasian auctioneer and price-taking in standard
competitive models since it allows strategic aspects of traders' behavior to be ignored. Its
purpose is again to simplify the nature of the conjectures that people make about what could
have happened in the past.
The proposition indicates that any price path which is monotone increasing is an equi-
librium. In addition the fundamental is of course also an equilibrium. This multiplicity of
equilibria is similar to that which arises in infinite horizon overlapping generations mod-
els. As in these cases one way of describing which equilibrium occurs is to associate each
equilibrium with the outcome of an exogenous random event or "sunspot."
The analysis above has the feature that agents' decisions to leave the market are exoge-
nous. As discussed in the introduction, "death" is not meant to be taken literally but rather
is meant to represent any event that causes the trader to leave the market. For example,
death could correspond to the timing of liquidity needs. The decision to leave the market can
be made endogenous, and the model correspondingly more realistic, by extending the basic
model outlined above. In this subsection we sketch such an extension. Proofs are provided
in Allen and Gorton (1988).
To endogenize the exit decision suppose that there is a possibility of bankruptcy in which
case the security will pay off zero immediately. There is also assumed to be a level of wealth
14for each traderbeyondwhichthemarginal utility of consumption is so low that the rate at
which their wealth is increasing is insufficient to compensate them for the risk of the firm
going bankrupt so they sell and leave the market. In other words, for trader i:
u(C)=C forC<C
= C,'forC￿C.




where/3 is the unobservable realisation of a random variable distributed uniformly on (0, 0.5).
For Person 3 it is also the case that
C=I1(0.05—Cfl. (7)
Agents learn their C at I = 0. The realisations are privateinformation.
Note that if /3 were a constant, then knowledge of C would be sufficient to prevent
hubbies because all other agents' C's could be computed once some agent was approached to
buy the security. An agent would then know how many other agents remained in the market
and an unravelling argument would hold. But, bubbles can exist if we suppose that there is
another source of uncertainty, such as 3 which reflects uncertainty about how the death times
are linked. Even though each agent knows his own C, the second source of uncertainty, /3,
does not allow agents to infer the ordering of C"s and so the sequence of logical conjectures
here is similar to the previous case. Because of the uncertainty induced by /3, there is always
a positive probability of another buyer. By specifying a set of beliefs corresponding to the
probabilities induced by the distribution of death times given the distribution of 13, it can
be shown that bubbles exist. As before a buyer will be willing to buy because he rationally
conjectures that all future buyers will also buy. (This is proven in Allen and Gorton (1988).)
It can readily be seen that for C in the relevant range 0 C 0.05 a trader will sell
the share when his wealth reaches C. This is because the utility from holding the share
15(assuming he is not thelastperson) is increasing when wealthis below C anddecreasing
when it is above. When trader i's wealth reaches C the effectisthe same as dying in terms
ofhis behavior: he sells and leaves the market. The formal arguments are similar since
the structure of the C"s (i =1,2,3)induces the same ordering of exits as was previously
assumed by the structure of death times.
In the case sketched there is a dramatic change in traders' marginal utilities of consump-
tion. In general this is not necessary. All that is required is that there is some critical
consumption level such that the marginal utility of consumption is low enough that it is
no longer worthwhile holding onto the security because there is a chance of bankruptcy.
Hence, in principal, any standard utility function, u(.), with a declining marginal utility of
consumption can be consistent with bubbles provided the marginal utility of consumption
falls to a low enough level. The assumption concerning the possibility that the security will
be retired ensures that it is strictly optimal for the agents to sell the stock when they reach
their critical consumption level.
An important feature of the case with standard utility functions is that the correlated
structure of death times that was assumed previously is no longer critical. In the case
considered, Persons 2 and 3 have identical utility functions but this is not essential. The
critical consumption levels determine the period of time the traders hold the share; the
ordering of times at which the traders leave is determined by the order in which they receive
the share. The main thing that is important is that traders cannot identify whether or not
they are the last person who is prepared to buy the share; it must always be possible that
the person selling the share is the one that was endowed with it so that one other person
remains to sell it to. Provided they always attach a positive probability to being able to
resell they arc strictly better oIl buying the share and bubbles can exist.
In the model analyzed in Section 2.1 and 2.2 it was possible for buyers, between 0 ￿ t
1/3, to make money since they were sure there would be a seller. However, this feature is
16due to the particular form of equations (1)and(2).Itcanbe seen that in the version of the
modelin this section,where (I) and (2) are replacedby(6) and (7), there is never any time
periodin whichbuyerscan becertaintheywillbeableto sell the stock. Hence, the only
people willing totradeinthe marketwillbeportfolio managers whose payoff iseffectivelya
calloption.
3 The entire stock market
In the previous section we considered the three traders who trade the stock which experiences
the bubble. The three people who trade this stock are strictly better off in expected utility
terms from doing this compared to not doing anything, even when they are risk averse.
Person 1 is endowed with the stock and is able to sell at a positive price. The traders who
are not endowed with the stock, Persons 2 and 3, are also strictly better off. The reason
for this is that the money they invest is not their own. They manage other people's money
and keep a share of any of the profits they make. If they are unsuccessful they repay less
than they were given to manage and are no worse off than if they had not managed people's
wealth. This implies, of course, that the lenders cannot make money or break even by lending
to these portfolio managers alone. Why then would anybody be willing to lend to them?
In this section we consider a more complete model of the stock market with asymmetric
information, where it is optimal for people to lend to portfolio managers using the contract
assumed in (Alo).
In the complete model consumers who wish to invest at t =1invest their money with
portfolio managers. There are two types of portfolio managers. 'Good' portfolio managers
can identify a limited amount of undervalued securities. 'Bad' portfolio managers have
no superior information. We begin, in Section 3.1, by describing how the good portfolio
managers can profit from their superior information. We develop a setting similar to thatof
the Glosten-Milgrom (1985) model. Then, in Section 3.2, we consider optimal contractual
17arrangements between the investing consumers, who cannot observe portfolio manager type,
and the portfolio managers. We show that the optimal contract involves pooling. Thus, in
equilibrium, the losses of the bad portfolio managers, who speculate in thebubble stock,
are effectively subsidized by the good portfolio managers. Figure 4 portraysthe component
parts of the entire stock market.
In Section 2 the payoffs to the security were known with certainty by everybody and the
appropriate definition of a bubble was clear; if the security traded above its fundamental
(the present value of its payoffs) this was said to be a bubble. With asymmetric information
the notion of a bubble must be modified since investors with different information sets can
have different views on a stock's fundamental. In this case one appropriate definition of a
bubble is when the security trades at a price which is greater than the fundamental that is
the highest out of all investors' information sets. The notion of a bubble used in Section 2
is then a special case of this definition where everybody has the same information about a
particular security.
There are two types of people who acquire the necessary qualifications to become a
portfolio manager. There are good portfolio managers, denoted by the subscript g, who can
identify securities which are undervalued. The amount of stock they can identify as being
undervalued costs B.Thesecond type of person that attains the qualifications necessary to
become a portfolio manager cannot identify undervalued securities. They can only identify
bubble securities, and find it optimal to speculate as described in Section 2. These managers
are denoted by the subscript s.Thelender cannot observe the type of the portfolio manager.
In this case it may be possible for type sportfoliomanagers to obtain funds to speculate
with even though in a full information world they would not be able to do so.
There are assumed to be two types of stocks: (i) asymmetric information stocks; and
(ii) symmetric information stocks. Good portfolio managers can profit from their superior
information by trading asymmetric information stocks, as we explain below. Bad portfolio
18managers speculate in the symmetric information stocks and bubbles may exist in these.
We assume that all agents are risk neutral and also add the following assumptions to the
basic model.
(A15) There is a group of risk neutral lenders who are prepared to lend as much as in-
vestment firms require provided that on average their expected return is equal to their
opportunity cost, ,whichfor simplicity is taken to be zero.
(A16) Investment firms cannot credibly precommit to keep on employing bad managers
once they have been identified as bad.
(A17) The investment firms operate in a competitive industry and so make zero expected
profits.
(A 18) For ease of exposition we assume that the bad portfolio managers can identify a
bubble stock with the price path and distribution of returns considered in Section 2.2.
They each have a probability of 1/3 of being Persons 1, 2 and 3. This implies that
the probability distribution of their final gross return y (i.e., including the money they
borrow initially), given that B= 1,is distributed as illustrated by the solid line in
Figure 5. Person 1 makes a profit which is uniformly distributed between 0 and 1 so
their gross profit is uniformly distributed between 1 and 2. Person 2 and Person 3's
profit depends on whether or not they are found by Person 1 when he decides to sell
the stock. If they are found they make a profit which is uniformly distributed between
oand1/3 so that their gross return is uniformly distributed between I and 4/3. If
they are not found by Person I when he sells, they make a loss which is uniformly
distributed between 1/3 and I so their gross return is uniformly distributed between 0
and 2/3.
(A19) The good portfolio managers can each identify undervalued securities which cost
19B = I(but no more than this). A portfolio of these securities has a stochastic return
y which has the distribution shown by the dotted line in Figure 5.
(A20) The good portfolio managers represent a proportion y of the total and the portfolio
managers who speculate represent a proportion I —yof those who manage portfolios.
(A21) It is not possible for a lender to observe whether the portfolio manager invests his
money in a profitable investment or whether it is used for speculation. However, the
final value of y is observable and can be contracted upon.
(A22) The parameter values are such that the portfolio managers who cannot identify the
undervalued stocks are better off speculating than investing in all securities.
(A23) As in Glosten and Milgrom (1985), there exists a number of uninformed traders who
face immediate liquidity needs which they satisfy by selling their securities. There also
exists a number of uninformed traders who desire to buy securities. We refer to these
traders as liquidity sellers and liquidity buyers, respectively. Liquidity sellers needs
are greater than the aggregate amount that good portfolio managers have available for
investment.
3.1 Profitable trading with superior information
In this subsection we develop a model in which the good portfolio managers make profits by
trading the asymmetric information stocks. These profits offset the losses made by the bad
portfolio managers who may speculate in some of the symmetric information stocks, which
we term "bubble" stocks. The reason that good portfolio managers can make a profit is
that there are liquidity traders whose consumption needs are sufficiently urgent that they
are forced to sell at a price below the expected value of the stock.
A common form of trading is one in which a market institution posts bid and ask prices,
but limits the quantity that may be traded at that price. Trade is sequential. Over time
20both traderswithsuperior information, and uninformed traders, buy and sell at these prices.
As they transact, both the bid and the askpricesare adjusted upwards or downwards to
reflect the information conveyed by the trades. This idea is elegantly modeled by Glosten
and Milgrom (1985). In their model the market institution faces adverse selection and a
zero profit condition. The market institution conditions the posted bid and ask prices on
the event of a trade, so the prices are "regret free." The informed traders make money; the
liquidity traders lose a corresponding amount. We use a version of this model for asymmetric
information stocks.
In this setting we can prove the following proposition:
Proposition 2The initially posted bid and ask prices are lower than the unconditional
expected security values so that uninformed buyers break even; liquidity sellers receive less
than the unconditional expected value of their securities; and good portfolio managers have
positive expected profits conditional on their information.
Tosee this, start by considering (A23). According to this assumption liquidity traders
need to sell their shares immediately. In order to do this uninformed liquidity buyers must
participate because the good portfolio managers (who are informed) do not have sufficient
funds to satisfy the sellers' needs. Thus, the initially posted prices cannot be above the
unconditional expected values of the shares, since the uninformed traders would be unwilling
to buy at SUCh prices.
Next, suppose prices were equal to the unconditional expected values of the shares. At
such prices, the good portfolio managers will select stocks which arc undervalued. The good
stocks will have larger orders than bad stocks. Bad portfolio managers, and other uninformed
agents, have an incentive to submit orders for the market portfolio. This is because they
are risk neutral and have no information. They are, therefore, indifferent between buying
the market and any other investment strategy. At the expected prices, good stocks will be
21oversubscribed. Bad stocks will be undersubscribed. Thus, only a proportion of the orders
for good stocks will be filled at the initial low price; the remaining orders will be filled at
the new price. As a result, good managers will make a profit. But, bad portfolio managers
will be rationed and, anticipating this outcome, they will not participate when the price is
equal to the unconditional expected value.
Finally, consider the case where initially posted prices are below the unconditional ex-
pected security values such that uninformed traders earn their opportunity cost. In order for
liquidity traders to meet their need for cash, the uninformed must be induced to participate
in the initial round of trading. This can only occur if the initially posted prices are below
the unconditional expected security values thus demonstrating the proposition.
There are no uninformed traders other than liquidity traders in the Glosten and Milgrom
model. Here there are bad portfolio managers who are uninformed. They, however, will
not make money if they trade the asymmetric information stocks. Consequently, they will
choose to trade the symmetric information stocks where they can make money. For these
stocks there is no bid-ask spread. These are the potential bubble stocks which trade above
their fundamental as discussed in Section 2. Note also that the good portfolio managers
make money early on. If they were to trade in the symmetric information stocks they would
effectively be trading with their own money since they would jeopardize losing their payment.
hence they are not prepared to trade in the market for symmetric information stocks and it
is only the bad portfolio managers that participate.
3.2 Optimal contracts for portfolio managers
Good portfolio managers can benefit from their superior information during this initial round
of trading. Ordinary investors can invest in these securities on their own and obtain an
expected return of 5. Hence this is their opportunity cost. In order to be willing to lend
to portfolio managers ordinary investors must obtain an expected return of at least S from
22theni.
Assumption (A 16), concerning the absence of precommitment, is important because it
ensures a pooling equilibrium. Investment firms make a loss employing bad portfolio man-
agers. Therefore1 once they have identified a manager as bad, they will fire him. This implies
that bad portfolio managers will behave in exactly the same way as good ones during the job
application process no matter what contracts the firm offers; any contract which is attractive
to good portfolio managers will also attract bad portfolio managers in the same proportions
as they exist in the population. We start by considering this pooling equilibrium.
Since the investment firms earn zero profits and must earn a return equal to investors'
opportunity cost of S to attract lenders, it follows that the optimal payment schedule must
satisfy the following program:
max E,[y—r(y) (8) x(y)
subjectto
7E97r(y) + (1 —y)E3ir(y)￿B(l+ 5), (9)
where E9 denotes the expectation operator with respect to the good portfolio managers' dis-
tribution of returns and E. denotes the expectation operator with respect to the distribution
for the bad portfolio managers that speculate.
It is possible to show the following.
Proposition 3 When S =0,-y =0.157,B =1,=0.95,and the portfolio managers are
risk neutral, the contract with the linear repayment schedule:
r(y) =1+ O.95(y —1)for y ￿1
(10) =y fory<l.
is such that lenders earn their opportunity cost and is an optimal contract.
It can readily be verified that investors earn their opportunity cost. To see this that
the contract is optimal consider the first part of the schedule specified in (10). The good
23portfolio managers only produce outputs in this region. The expected revenuereceived from
Lhem is given by
E37r(y)=j3 2(y)dy+j2() ir(y)dy. (11)
For y ￿ I the expected revenue received from the bad portfolio managers is
Er(y)=Egr(y),
(12)
where the superscript 1 refers to the expectations taken over the range y ￿ 1. Hence, no
matter what the form of the payment schedule ir(y) the amount of revenue raised from the
bad portfolio managers is always 2/3 the amount raised from the good managers; altering
the form of the payment schedule for y ￿ I does not enable any more to be extracted from
the bad group. It follows that the first part of the schedule in the proposition is optimal.
The second part of the schedule for y < 1 is also optimal because only bad portfolio
managers produce outputs which fall in this region. The good portfolio managers'utility
is unaffected by the form of the payment schedule in this region and lowering the payment
below y can only reduce the revenue raised from the bad portfolio managers. Thus, the
second part of the payment schedule is optimal.
Since 5 = 0 the bad portfolio manager is clearly better off speculating than investing in all
securities. The fact that 5=0 also means it is not worthwhile changing the payment schedule
so that the bad portfolio managers choose to invest in all securities since the expected
return on these is the same as investing in the bubble security. Hence, the proposition is
demonstrated.
3.3 Discussion
The call option form of portfolio managers' compensation schemes creates the possibility of
bubbles, as outlined in the analysis of Section 2. Bad portfolio managers will be willing to
trade bubble securities at prices which are higher than the highest fundamental perceived
24by anyofthetraders.For example, suppose that one of the securities that is available is like
that in Section 2 and it is known by all traders to have a payoff of zero with certainty. Thus
all traders have the same information set with regard to this security and this is common
knowledge. As in Section 2, the security can trade at a positive price so that there is a
bubble. Even if groups have different beliefs about the fundamental of a security it will still
be possible to show that bad portfolio managers will be willing to trade the stock at a price
above the maximum. The call option feature of portfolio managers' compensation schemes
means they can be willing to purchase a stock if there is some prospect of a capital gain even
though they know with certainty that its price will fall below its current level at some point
in the future. This means it would even be possible to use a definition of bubble where the
price must be above the highest possible payoff which is given positive probability by any
investor and still obtain examples of a bubble.
In order to derive the proposition it was assumed that all agents are risk neutral. If
agents are risk averse then the form of the optimal contract will not be the same as that
in Proposition 3; risk sharing will become a factor. Nevertheless, the characteristics of the
contract will usually be similar. It will be optimal to extract revenue from the bad portfolio
managers by penalizing poor performance and rewarding good performance. Although the
optimal contract may not have the exact form of a call option, it may often provide incentives
forbad managers to speculate and go for large risky payoffs even when this is associated
with poor average returns.
Assumption (A16), about the absence of precommitment, ensured that only a pooling
equilibriumexisted. If investment firms can precomrnit to retain a manager even when they
know he is bad and will not make profitable investments, then a pooling and a separating
equilibrium may exist. The pooling equilibrium is the same as that described above. The
separating equilibrium involves the investment firm offering a menu of contracts to separate
the good managers from the bad. In a separating equilibrium, there arc two payment sched-
25tiles: one for the good managers, ir9, and one for the bad managers, lrb. These are chosen to
maximize (8) subject to (9) and the constraints that the had managers do not have a strict
incentive to want to mimic the good managers and vice versa. Thus, the assumption of no
precommitment plays an important role in the analysis since it ensures a pooling equilibrium.
En the setting of this section the bad managers always pooled with the good managers. It
is worth pointing out an alternative assumption which would also result in bubbles. Suppose
that portfolio managers do not learn whether they are good or bad until after their contracts
have been signed. In this case there is no possibility of a separating equilibrium and if the
contracts are designed to minimize losses due to the bad portfolio managers, the optimal
contract can again be like a call option.
4 Robustness and implications
This essay has addressed a theoretical question, namely, can a security trade above its
fundamental when there are a finite number of traders with a finite amount of wealth, and
there is a finite horizon? We have shown that their exists a class of models different from
those considered by Tirole (1982) where rational behavior is consistent with security price
bubbles. The bubbles can grow at any rate, at least for short periods. If one imagines
repetitions of the model, nothing rules out bubbles starting again after they have crashed
in the previous period. They can occur on finitely lived securities. Clearly similar bubbles
could occur with infinitely lived securities. Perhaps most importantly, the model explains
the setting in which bubbles can arise and shows when and how they end.
We have demonstrated the existence of bubbles by considering a specific example. For
tractability the assumptions made were very specific. This was necessary to enable a set
of self-fulfilling beliefs that ensure existence of equilibrium to be identified. An important
question concerns the robustness of this example. In other words how general is the class
of models in which bubbles can arise? There are four elements of the example that appear
26crucial to the result:
1. At any point in time there must be an infinite number of trading possibilities before
the horizon.
2. Agents must be unable to deduce whether or not they are the last person in the market.
3. Markets are inefficient so that there exists a group of portfolio managers that makes
an above normal rate of return which allows the losses of the bad portfolio managers
to be covered.
4. The agency relationship between investors and portfolio managers involves a compen-
sation scheme for the managers which has the form of a call option and can induce risk
loving behavior.
We discuss each of these points in turn and then make some final comments.
Continuous time is an important feature of our model because it allows for an infinite
number of trading possibilities even though the horizon of the model is finite. This alone
does not allow bubbles to exist. In our model there are a finite number of agents, and Tirole
(1982) showed that bubbles cannot exist in infinite horizon models with a finite number
of agents. While it is clear that bubbles of the type considered in this paper require an
infinite number of trading possibilities, the example we presented is not isomorphic to an
infinite horizon overlapping generations model; there are a finite number of agents in our
model whereas in an overlapping generations model there is an infinite number of agents.
Nevertheless, it is possible to reinterpret the model here as an infinite horizon model with
infinitely-lived agents.
The second point concerns the information that agents have. The factor that is critical
for our result is that agents have an identification problem. In particular, they must not be
able to deduce whether or not they are the last person. In the example presented, adding one
27piece of information allows traders to determinewhether they are the last person. However,
this does not mean that the result is not robust since adding an extra sourceof noise restored
the original result, as shown in Section 2.3.
The third point relates to the assumption that securities markets are not strong-form
efficient. There are a number of ways in which markets may not be strong-formefficient.
We modelled this inefficiency by assuming the presence of some traders with urgentneeds
to trade, following Glosten and Milgrom (1985). All that is really requiredis some form
of inefficiency where one group can outperform another. For example, a version ofthe
Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) model where a group of traders has a comparative advantage
at gathering information, will lead to similar results.
The fourth point concerns the importance of a compensation scheme for portfolio man-
agers that has the form of a call option and inducesrisk loving behavior. In the examples
above the bubbles can be thought of as a manifestation of the inefficiency resulting from
this aspect of the agency relationship between investors and portfolio managers. This is the
counterpart of the well-known result in the corporate finance literature thatdebt-financed
firms may be willing to accept negative net present value investments (see, e.g., Jensen and
Meckling (1976)).
An important assumption of the analysis showing this type of compensation scheme is
optimal is that the minimum payoff to portfolio managers is zero. This implies that they
cannot be penalized at all. As in many models of agency relationships, if the agent can
post his own capital to guarantee performance, the agency problem is mitigated and may
disappear. For example, in the corporate finance context if firms can post enough collateral
to guarantee the loan they will not have an incentive to undertake negative net present
value projects. This solution is not often feasible since firms often cannot post collateral.
Similarly, in many situations portfolio managers will not be able to post capital to guarantee
their performance.
28In practice, portfolio managers do not usually bond themselves in thisway. Prior to 1985
in the U.S., for example, the SEC prohibited investment fees from dependingdirectly on the
change in value of the portfolio. Typically, the fees for portfoliomanagers were based on
assets under management. Thus, if a manager did well then his fees would increase because
new investors would be attracted to invest under his direction. There were nopayments
from the manager to the investors if performance was bad. The worst that couldhappen as
a result of poor manager performance was a zero fee (see Crinold and Rudd (1987)). Since
1985 incentive fees have been permitted. Kritzman (1987) points out that in thiscase:
Incentive fees are typically structured with two components—a base fee,.. . and
a contingent fee, which allows the manager to share in the incremental return
relative to an established benchmark. Themanager does not usually share in
negative relative returns; that is, he does not pay his client when he underper-
forms the benchmark. This asymmetric structure essentiallygrants the money
manager a call option on some fraction of incremental return. .. . Itis possible that a manager .. . willexpose the portfolio to undue risk in the absence of any
insights whatsoever. (p. 21, 22.)
Thus, our modelling of the compensation scheme for portfoliomanagers as a call option,
which is essential to the results in the model, tends to correspond to what is observed in
practice. Also its possible inducement of risk-loving behavior is well-recognized.
There are two further considerations with regard to theagency relationship. The first
concerns the available alternative investments. In the example of Section 3 it was shown that
it was strictly better for the bad portfolio managers to invest in the bubble security than the
alternatives. In general, this result will not hold if the alternatives arc sufficiently attractive.
However, given the call option feature of the compensation scheme it will hold inmany
situations. The second consideration concerns the effects of repeating the relationship. Often
in agency models the effects of reputation mitigate the problem. In portfoliomanagement
it is not clear this occurs. Bad managers must consistently produce high returns in order
to remain pooled with good managers. In order to achieve this they have to take risky
positions. Thus the problem may be exacerbated rather than mitigated.
29Any arguments concerning the generality of the example presented are clearly only spec-
ulative. The important issue for future research is to identify more precisely how general
is the class of models where bubbles exist. Our approach is one of a numberbased on
rational behavior that is currently being developed. Work related to ours includes that of
Faust (1989). He demonstrates the existence of fiat money in a finite horizon model. In a
continuous time setting, Faust shows that if the finite horizon is far enough away, then the
terminal point does not rule out the existence of fiat money.
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